INTRODUCTION
After the expiration of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836, for nearly three decades, only the states were in the business of chartering and regulating banks. The need to finance the Civil War revived the interest in national banks and prompted Congress in 1863 to pass a bill to create a national banking system. Congress extensively revised and re-enacted the measure in June of the following year .1 Section 85 of the resulting National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) 2 sought to protect the newly established national banks from the state legislatures' probable discrimination by conferring on national banks the so-called most favored lender status. According to the "most favored lender" doctrine, NBA section 85 gives a distinct advantage to national banks over their state-chartered counterparts by enabling national banks located 3 in any state to charge the highest rate that any state-chartered lender in that state may charge for the same class of loans. 4 By allowing national banks sitting in any 1. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND PoUTics IN AMERICA 723-24, 727, 731 (1957) . 2. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (1994) ). Section 85 of the NBA, as originally worded, read:
[E]very association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state or territory where the bank is located, and no more, except that where by the laws of any state a different rate is limited for banks of issue organized under state laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized in any such state under this act. Ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)) (emphasis added). This provision was originally § 30 of the NBA. For simplicity's sake, it is referred to as § 85 throughout this Note.
3. For purposes of NBA § 85, a bank is "located" either in the place designated in its "organizational certificate" or in the places in which it has established authorized branches. See Marquette Natl. Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 309 n.21 (1978) (citing Citizens & S. Natl. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977) ).
4. The nature of national banks' special status was not initially obvious. The confusion stemmed mainly from the "except" clause in § 85. For the original text of § 85, see supra note 2. It was unclear whether national banks located in a state were limited to charging interest only at the rates that state banks were allowed to charge under the laws of that state state to "borrow" the interest rates that the most favored lenders of that state are allowed to charge, Congress, in effect, preempted state interest-rate laws that otherwise would apply to credit transactions of national banks.
The enactment in 1980 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA) 5 extended the scope of the most favored lender doctrine. Section 521 6 of the DIDA was aimed at creating a competitive, level playing field between national banks and state banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) . To achieve this end, Congress duplicated the language of NBA section 85 in wording DIDA section 521 and thus extended the most favored lender status to FDIC-insured state banks. 7 In Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., s a case decided two years prior to the passage of the DIDA, the Supreme Court unanimously held that, under section 85 of the NBA, national banks located in one state may charge interest at the rate authorized by the laws of that state even on transactions with residents of another state. 9 In addition, although it did not directly consider the issue of the most favored lender doctrine, the Court implicitly reaffirmed the doctrine. 10 The net result of the decision or at higher rates if the Jaws of that state allowed other nonbank lenders to charge higher rates.
The in Marquette is that national banks sitting in one state may "export"11 the most favored lender rates allowed by the laws of that state to residents of other states. Furthermore, Congress's duplication of the language of NBA section 85 in DIDA section 521 means that the Marquette holding gives the same privilege to FDICinsured state banks.
Taking their cue from Marquette, many banks in the early 1980s moved their credit-card operations to a few states -such as Delaware, Nebraska, and South Dakota -that had raised or removed interest-rate ceilings and relaxed other consumer-creditprotection laws in order to attract banks and thereby generate revenues. Marquette thus has enabled banks to conduct their nationwide consumer-credit transactions from very favorable environments. The decision also has put pressure on legislatures in other, less accommodating states to repeal or relax their own interest-rate limits in response to threats by banks to move their creditcard operations elsewhere.12
From their protected environments, the credit-card-issuing banks have aggressively conducted their nationwide consumercredit transactions. These banks, in the process, have been ignoring not only the laws of various states dealing specifically with interest rates -laws that have been preempted expressly by NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 -but also other state consumer-creditprotection laws. Marquette thus has created a regulatory scheme in which a few states with the weakest consumer-protection laws can veto the consumer-protection laws of other states and dictate the terms by which consumers in all fifty states buy credit. This is a troubling result given that consumers in Massachusetts or Colorado are unable to lobby in the legislative halls of Delaware or South Dakota.
A series of class-action suits in recent years has challenged the assumption, widely held by banks, that the preemptive reach of NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 extend beyond state interest-rate laws, to various state consumer-credit-protection laws. In Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 13 a federal district court in Massachusetts ruled that an FDIC-insured, Delaware-chartered bank cannot impose late fees 14 as permitted by Delaware law on 11. 439 U.S. at 314.
12. See, e.g., Tony Munroe, Virginia Law Change Attracts Credit Card Companies, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at Cl;  see also David Conn, Key Federal Shifting Credit Card Unit to Delaware Official Blames Md. Restrictions, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 16, 1993 , at 9C. 13. 776 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mass. 1991 , revd., 971 F.2d 818 {1st Cir. 1992) , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993) . 14. cardmember agreements usually stipulate that the card holder must make a minimum monthly payment, calculated from time to time by reference to the balance outstanding. Failure to make this payment in a timely fashion constitutes default. A late fee is credit-card transactions with residents of Massachusetts because of a Massachusetts usury-law provision prohibiting such fees. A year later, the First Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that section 521 of the DIDA preempted the Massachusetts usury law regulating late fees as well as Massachusetts's cap on numerical percentage rates of interest. 15 The First Circuit's decision, however, did not stem the tide of state-law-based consumer class-action suits filed across the country against both national and FDIC-insured state banks issuing credit cards. 1 6 As the First Circuit recognized, 17 the ultimate issue at stake in these lawsuits is the delicate and increasingly uncertain balance between the regulatory powers of the federal government and the states in our dual banking system. 18 This Note argues that neither section 85 of the NBA nor section 521 of the DIDA preempts state consumer-credit-protection laws regulating late fees on credit-card transactions. Part I discusses the three approaches that the Supreme Court has devised and used over the years to determine when a federal law preempts state law: express preemption, implied preemption, and conflict preemption. Part II applies express preemption analysis and asserts that the ordinary meaning of DIDA section 521's express preemption language does not evince Congress's intent to preempt state prohibitions of late fees. Part III applies implied preemption analysis and argues that neither NBA section 85 nor DIDA section 521 impliedly preempts state laws regulating late fees because Congress did not indicate a clear and manifest purpose to preempt the entire field of consumer-credit protection. Finally, Part IV applies conflict assessed upon such a default or when the default is not cured within a designated period of time.
15. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992) , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993 Spellman v. Meridian Bank, No. 94-3203, No. 94-3204, No. 94-3215, No. 94-3216, No. 94-3217, No. 3218, 1995 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995) , cert. granted No. 95-860, 1996 WL 18433 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996 ; Stoorman v. Greenwood Trust Co., 888 P.2d 289 {Colo. Ct. App. 1994), affd., No. 94SC382, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 764 (Dec. 18, 1995 Copeland v. MBNA Am., N.A., 883 P.2d 564 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) , affd., 907 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1995); Siemientkowski v. Bank One Columbus, N.A., No. 66531, 1994 WL 663483 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994 . By contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania superior courts have held that neither NBA § 85 nor DIDA § 521 supplants state laws regulating credit-card late fees. See Sherman v. Citibank, N.A., 1995 N.J. LEXIS 1355 (Nov. 28, 1995 Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co., 1995 NJ. LEXIS 1354 (Nov. 28, 1995 ; In re Citibank Credit Card Litigation, 653 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. Ct.1995 85, 95 (1983) . But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 808 (1994) (" [N] either conflict preemption nor field preemption is justified from the perspective of ordinary statutory interpretation used to determine what Congress has actually done. In fact, these two doctrines divert attention from actual intent.").
26. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987) 
A. Two Approaches To Analyzing an Express Preemption Provision
The Supreme Court's recent preemption jurisprudence reveals two competing approaches to analyzing express preemption provisions. The point of contention between the two approaches is the applicability of the presumption against displacement of states' historic police powers.29
According to one approach, although the presumption against displacement of ·states' traditional police powers is applicable in implied preemption cases, it is inappropriate once Congress has indicated unmistakably its intent to preempt state laws by an express est rates, if the applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such State bank or insured branch of a foreign bank would be permitted to charge in the absence of this subsection, such State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank may, notwith· standing any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at a rate of not more than 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank is located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district where the bank is located, whichever may be greater. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994) (emphasis added). As the emphasized portion shows, § 521 confers on FDIC-insured state banks, not only the option of charging interest at the most fa· vored lender rate, but also the option of charging one percent above the Federal Reserve discount rate. Here, the drafters of § 521 were merely following the language of NBA § 85 which was revised in 1933 to include the one percent above the Federal Reserve discount· rate option. See Banking Act of 1933 , Pub. L. No. 66, ch. 89, § 25 48 Stat. 162, 191 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994 ). This latter option is irrelevant for purposes of this Note and therefore is ignored hereinafter. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that states' traditional police powers are not to be superseded unless that was the "clear and manifest purpose" of Congress).
See
provision. 30 In express preemption cases, courts must apply the "ordinary" principles of statutory construction to ascertain the boundaries of the preemptive scope. 31 Courts must defer to the "ordinary" meaning of the statutory language even when a narrower construction of the statutory language can plausibly be given. 32
According to the second approach, the presumption against displacenent of states' traditional police powers applies in express preemption analyses as well as in implied preemption analyses.33 This second approach demands the narrowest possible construction of the statutory language 34 or at least one narrower than what the ordinary-principles approach requires.
Obviously, the ordinary-principles approach establishes a lower threshold than the narrow-construction approach for finding an express preemption. If an analysis relying on the ordinary principles of statutory construction fails to yield a finding of preemption, then it follows that a narrower construction of the same statute will fail as well. The initial question, then, is whether the above-cited language of DIDA section 521 displaces state laws prohibiting late fees on credit-card transactions under the "ordinary" principles of statutory construction.3s ''3 9 Moreover, section 521 mentions the word rate six times, while using interest only twice; both times, the word interest is accompanied by rate. 40 One naturally infers from these definitions that, although interest can mean a charge other than a numerical percentage of the sum originally borrowed, the most "ordinary" meaning of the term refers to a numerical percentage of the borrowed sum. Furthermore, it violates the ordinary meaning of the term to suggest that interest rate signifies anything other than a numerical percentage States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority, completely displacing the States."); see also The First Circuit's approach, however, ignores the fact that the "ordinary" meaning of the statutory language delineates the proper scope of preemption. This reliance on the ordinary meaning cannot be overcome by merely taking note of a handful of instances when the Supreme Court, in using the word interest, meant something more than a numerical percentage of a borrowed sum. The ordinary meaning of a word used by Congress "is not determined by reference to variations on its ordinary meaning, but by the prdinary meaning itself, i.e., the way it is generally used."47
The Greenwood court also opined that the meaning of interest rate, as that term is used in DIDA section 521, is not limited to the 41. Cf. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 532 {1976) {"It twists the language beyond the breaking point to say that a law mandating that labeling contain certain information is not a 'labeling requirement' [as that term is used in § 408 of the Federal Meat Inspection Act].").
42. One court stated: "Similarly, in common parlance, 'interest rate' or 'rate of interest' has a very narrow meaning. For example, when one is asked what interest rate he or she is paying on a loan, the response is, 'eleven and one-half percent' or 'ten and three-eights percent.' If it is a real estate loan, the response may be, 'nine and one-half percent, and two points.' Conversely, lay persons are not likely to associate 'interest rate' with late payment fees, return check fees, etc., because those fees are usually contingent upon the borrower's default, and are not part of the 'interest' paid to obtain the funds." Mazaika v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 653 A.2d 640, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994 (1873)). The Shoemaker Court stated: "Interest accrues either by agreement of the debtor to allow it for the use of money, or, in the nature of damages, by reason of the failure of the debtor to pay the principal when due." 147 U.S. at 321. The Brown Court defined interest as "the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use or forbearance of money, or as damages for its detention." 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) at 185. Black's Law Dictionary apparently followed the first part of the Brown Court's statement -but not the last part containing the words "or as damages for its deten- In principle, the assumption that the ordinary meaning of an express preemption provision delineates the proper scope of preemption can be overcome. 52 An examination of a statute's legislative history may furnish reasons to set aside the presumption. Nothing, however, can be found in the legislative history of DIDA section 521 to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of that provision's preemptive language.
In order to displace the initial assumption, the DIDA's legislative history must clearly evince a legislative intent contrary to the ordinary meaning of section 521. Section 521, however, was an emergency measure enacted with very little congressional debate.s3
48. See Greenwood, 971 F2d at 825-26. The First Circuit cited a variety of cases to buttress its claim that "[t]erms in an act whose meaning may appear plain outside the scheme of the statute can take on a different meaning when read in their proper context." 971 F.2d at 825 (citations omitted). Yet, the court failed to cite any instances when the term interest rate was interpreted to mean anything other than a numerical percentage rate of a borrowed sum.
49. 482 U.S. 1 {1987).
50. In Fort Hallifax Packing, employers who had not provided severance payments to employees as required by a Maine law argued that any state laws pertaining to "employee benefits" were preempted by the preemption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) {1994 In principle, an examination of a statute's case law may defeat the assumption that the ordinary meaning delineates the scope of preemption.ss DIDA section 521 lacks any such case law, but the case law under NBA section 85 may appear to offer some hope to those who ignore the ordinary meaning of DIDA section 521. As observed in the Introduction, the language of DIDA section 521 closely mirrors that of NBA section 85. When a statute adopts words from an older statute, the judicial interpretation of those words in the older statute is also transplanted to the new statute. 56 It is then necessary to ask whether credit-card late fees should be considered interest or interest rate under the case law of NBA section 85. If so, the same fees ought to be considered interest or interest rate under DIDA section 521 as well.
In a series of cases, most de~ided prior to the enactment of the DIDA, courts ruled that various flat fees that national banks charge are interest and hence governed by section 85 of the NBA. So far, credit-card cash-advance fees,s 7 charges incurred by way of compensating balance requirements, 5 8 closing fees,59 bonuses and com- § § 521-523 of the DIDA, were simply absorbed into House Bill 4986 without ever being It is incorrect to infer from these decisions that credit-card late fees also should be considered interest under NBA section 85 and therefore also under DIDA section 521. A crucial conceptual distinction exists between credit-card late fees and the fiat fees at issue in the above-mentioned decisions. Whereas payments of fiat fees at issue in those decisions are preconditions for credit extensions, payments of late fees are not.66 Late fees are penalties, and they are charged only on contingent events of borrower default. Although agreeing to terms governing late-fee payments is a prerequisite for loan extensions, actual payment of such contingent default charges is not. This is not merely an armchair distinction. In Lorillard v. Pons, 6 7 the Supreme Court stated that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country [,] they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."68 Both prior to and after the passage of the NBA, in other contexts, the Supreme Court has distinguished interest, as that term is normally understood, from fees charged as penalties. Notably, in Spain v. Hamilton's Administrator, 69 a case decided one year before 60. See Cronkleton v. Hall, 66 F.2d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 1933 73. NBA § 85, as amended and codified, reads: Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under title 62 of the Revised Statutes. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). Section 85, as modified by the Banking Act of 1933 , Pub. L. No. 66, ch. 89, § 25, 48 Stat. 162, 191 (1933 , gives national banks, not only the option of charging interest at the most favored lender rate, but also the option of charging interest at one per-DIDA section 521 may impliedly preempt such state laws. When Congress's command is not unmistakably clear, a federal occupation of an entire subject area can be found only when the nature of the federal regulatory scheme permits no other conclusion. 74 Furthermore, when Congress legislates in a field that the states traditionally have occupied, courts must start with "the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. " 75
Congress has not preempted the entire field of bank regulation.76 The so-called dual banking system, in which both the federal and state governments exercise regulatory authority over both national and state banks, came into full being with the enactment of the NBA and has persisted to the present time.77 Even national banks "are governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation." 7 8 In general, states regulate national banks unless the pervasive nature of the federal regulatory scheme leaves no room for state regulations, or the effectiveness of national banks is impaired by the state regulation.79 cent above the Federal Reserve discount rate. As said above, see supra note 28, in connection with DIDA § 521, the latter option is irrelevant for purposes of this Note. 85 and DIDA section 521 deal specifically with interest rates, it is possible that the two federal statutes evince congressional intent to occupy the entire field of consumer-credit protection.
This Part argues that neither NBA section 85 nor DIDA section 521 indicates a clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt the entire field of consumer-credit protection. Section III.A points out that state laws regulating late fees fall within the field of consumer-credit protection, which is a field traditionally governed by the states. Therefore, the Supreme Court's usual presumption against displacement of states' traditional police powers applies to any implied preemption analysis relating to state laws regulating credit-card late fees. Section IIl.B shows that no "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" exists to surmount this presumption.
A. Presumption Against Displacement of States' Traditional Police Powers
Do state laws regulating credit-card late fees constitute exercises of states' traditional police powers?BO In the past, the Supreme Court has refused to supplant state laws -even when those laws significantly affected the workings of federal laws -if the states were exercising their traditional police powers.s1 tional banking laws or impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks' functions."); National Bank, 16 U.S. at 362 (" [T] he agencies of the Federal government are only exempted from State legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve that government. Any other rule would [constitute] ... an unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights of the States.").
80. Over the years, the Court has given very broad readings to the term "traditional police powers of the states." The following statement in 1882 is not atypical: "[T]he States have full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, including in that general designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of their people." Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 683 (1882); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) ("The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals .... "); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The traditional police power of the States has been deemed to embrace any measure thought to further the wellbeing of the State in question, subject only to the specific prohibitions contained ~ the Fed- State laws that regulate credit-card late fees are laws governing bank oper.ations. But they also can be classified as consumerprotection provisions. 82 As such, these state laws constitute exercises of state police powers aimed at the promotion of the "peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity"83 of citizens.
Consumer protection is an area traditionally occupied by the states. 84 Admittedly, it is not possible to draw a clear line between usury laws and consumer-protection laws. Usury laws or consumercredit-protection laws are the oldest and longest-surviving species of consumer-protection laws. 85 Yet, except in the area of interest-rate regulation, consumer-credit protection has been the concern of and is increasingly becoming the exclusive concern of the states as state legislatures fill the vacuum left by the federal government's gradual withdrawal from the field since 1980.86
In sum, states' regulation of credit-card late fees constitutes an exercise of their traditional police powers. It follows that the presumption against displacement of such laws applies.87
B. "Clear and Manifest Purpose of Congress"
The fact that the presumption against displacement of states' traditional police powers applies does not automatically rule out a In the cases in which the Supreme Court sustained a finding of implied preemption in a field traditionally occupied by the states, the pervasive nature of the federal regulation left no room for parallel or supplementary state regulations.s9 As argued in the previous section, Congress has not made plain its intent to occupy the entire field of consumer-credit protection by a pervasive scheme of regulation.9o Far from it, states' traditional powers in this area remain largely intact. The enactment in 1994 of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act9 1 is the latest indication that Congress will defer to the states in the field of consumer-credit protection. Section 102(b )(l)(B) of that legislation states:
The laws of the host State regarding ... consumer protection ... shall apply to any branch in the host State of an out-of-State national bank to the same extent as such State laws apply to a branch of a bank chartered by that State .... 92 It follows that state laws regulating credit-card late fees are preempted only if they actually conflict with the objectives of the NBA and the DIDA.
IV. CONFLICT PREEMPTION
Even when a federal statute does not occupy an entire field of regulation, it displaces a state law if that law stands as an obstacle to the full execution of the objectives of the federal law.93 It then must be asked whether a state law provision prohibiting or otherwise regulating late fees on credit-card transactions actually "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" 94 of the objectives of NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521. Congress's purpose in enacting NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 was to establish a competitive, level playing field among national banks, FDIC-insured state banks, and the most favored state lenders. The initial purpose of section 85 was to protect national banks from probable discrimination by the state legislatures.95 Congress sought to accomplish this goal by instituting parity between national and state lenders with respect to the charging of interest. Yet, the Supreme Court's subsequent construction of the NBA has established that section 85 does not exactly demand lender parity between national banks and state banks but rather lender parity between national banks and the "most favored lenders" of each state. 96 This is the most favored lender doctrine. Congress, however, did not confer upon national banks a position superior to that of the most favored state lenders.97
Likewise, it is clear from the language and history of DIDA section 521 that Congress's purpose in enacting this section was to achieve parity between national and FDIC-insured state banks. Section 521 begins with the words "In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered [banks] . . . with respect to interest rates." 98 Two bills, the contents of which eventually were absorbed into the DIDA to become sections 521 through 523, have the subtitle "To equalize competition between State and national banks. "99 Records of congressional debates on the DIDA also refer to the aim of achieving parity between national and FDIC-insured state banks. 100 As in the case of NBA section 85 and national banks, however, there is no evidence that, by enacting DIDA section 521, ("Congress intended to place national banks on an equal footing with competing institutions and individuals in their states of location . . . . However, there is no indication that Congress intended that the economic benefit to the national banks on such loans be greater than that available to others.").
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994 Congress meant to confer upon FDIC-insured state banks any privileges over and above those enjoyed by the most favored state lenders. This Part argues that state laws regulating late fees on creditcard transactions do not conflict with the objective of either NBA section 85 or DIDA section 521. Section IV.A observes that the objective of lender parity demands a scope of preemption greater than that of state laws governing interest rates alone. Section IV.B demonstrates that placing all state law provisions having some implications for creditors' aggregate yields and borrowers' aggregate costs -including those having the most tenuous link to interest rates -within the preemptive scope yields a result that neither banks nor consumers can accept. Therefore, what is needed is a scope of preemption greater than that of interest rates alone yet smaller than that of all state laws affecting creditors' yields and borrowers' costs. Section IV.C recommends drawing the line between state law provisions governing requirements preconditional to credit extensions and state law provisions regulating contingent occasions of default. The former type of provisions should be considered preempted by NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521. Section IV.C thus argues that the fact that state laws regulating credit-card late fees come into effect only on contingent occasions of default should be a sufficient condition for such laws to escape preemption. Finally, section IV.D responds to two possible objections to the solution proposed in section IV.C.
A. The Need for a Scope of Preemption Greater Than That of Interest Rates Alone
NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 demand a scope of preemption greater than that of interest rates alone given that some state laws regulating nonrate aspects of credit transactions stand in the way of achieving lender parity. This conclusion follows from how the ~o statutes operate in the intrastate loan-transaction setting.,,· An example illustrates this point. Assume that the State of Hutchins allows small loan companies chartered by that state to charge interest at twelve percent for a particular class of loans and allows banks to charge only nine percent for the same class of loans. NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 preempt the Hutchins law imposing the nine-percent ceiling for banks by permitting a national or FDIC-insured state bank located in Hutchins to "borrow" the twelve-percent rate for transactions involving the same class of loans. Often, however, the privilege of charging the higher rate of interest is accompanied by strict state law provisions ranging from those governing methods of rate computation to those aimed at (Vol. 94:1294 consumer protection. 101 · NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521, therefore, mandate a scope of preemption greater than that of interest rates. If national or FDIC-insured state banks located in Hutchins were allowed to lend at the most favored lender rate but were excused from such other provisions accompanying that rate, then the result would not be lender parity but a special advantage for those banks over the most favored state lenders. It follows that at least some state provisions accompanying the most favored lender rate must apply to credit transactions of national and FDICinsured state banks, and such provisions must be considered within the preemptive scope of NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521.
The need for a preemptive scope greater than that of interest rates was recognized also by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 1 02 in a 1936 interpretive ruling, which has been codified as a federal regulation. 10 3 That ruling stated that "[i]f State law permits a higher interest rate on a specified class of loans, a national bank making such loans at such higher rate is subject ... to the provisions of State law relating to such class of loans that are material to the determination of the interest rate. " 104 The OCC's words themselves do not provide any independent guidance in determining which nonrate state provisions are preempted by NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521. But the OCC's words furnish convenient labels that are used in the following paragraphs. Hereinafter, the word material is used as a convenient label to designate all state law provisions that need to be preempted along with the interest-rate provisions to achieve the objective of lender parity. Its opposite, immaterial, is used to designate all state law provisions that need not be preempted to achieve lender parity and those provisions whose preemption threaten lender parity by providing national and FDIC-insured state banks with privileges over and above those enjoyed by the most favored state lenders. To make a tautological statement then, to achieve full lender parity as NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 demand, a national or FDIC-insured bank charging the most favored lender rate must abide by material state law provisions that accompany that rate. The determination of whether NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 preempt states' credit-card late-fee provisions depends on where the line between material and immaterial state law provisions is drawn. It is far from clear exactly what type of state law provisions should be considered material to the determination of the interest rate. 105 The OCC itself has done much groping but has not ventured to articulate a standard.106
B. The All-or-Nothing Approach: An Impractical Option
One possible position to take is to refuse to ·draw the line at all and to consider all state law provisions having some implications for creditors' aggregate yields and borrowers' aggregate costs in credit transactions -including those having only the most tenuous connection to interest rates -materiaz. 10 1 Although this standard ultimately proves to be impractical, it is difficult to deny its initial intuitive appeal. True lender parity seems to demand completely equal treatment under state law. State law provisions regulating 105. As can be seen, the OCC interpretive ruling states that only those provisions "material to the determination of the interest rate," see 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1995) (emphasis added), are binding on the banks charging the most favored lender rate. A late-fee provision, as pointed out in section 11.B of this Note, is not in any way detenninative of the interest rate. Yet, this fact cannot be used to dispose hastily of the materiality issue. Even if a late-fee provision is not material to the determination of the interest rate, if it conflicts with the objective of either NBA § 85 or DIDA § 521, it must give way. Therefore, the abovequoted language must be treated as being equivalent to "material to the pursuit of lender parity."
106. In an interpretive letter, the OCC stated that a state law provision enumerating a number of notification requirements that lenders must comply with prior to the commencement of a retail-charge agreement is not material to the determination of the interest rate. OCC Staff Interpretation Letter No. I78, 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) q[ 97,239 (Jan. 12, 1981) . In the same letter, the OCC also stated that, if state law authorizes an interest rate for a loan of up to a certain amount, then the cap is material, and hence a bank borrowing the interest rate may not ignore the cap. See id. ("I can think of nothing more 'material' to the determination of an interest rate than the amount of the loan."); see also Kathleen E. Keest et al., Recent Developments Regarding Interest Rate Regulation, 48 Bus. LAW. 1085 , 1088 -90 (1993 (summarizing an unpublished OCC interpretive letter which opined that state law provisions setting forth the size and maturity of loans and the classes of borrowers to whom a given category of loans may be made are material, while opining that certain Texas creditunion regulations aimed at protecting the safety and soundness of credit unions are immaterial). But the OCC did not articulate a standard that others can appeal to in making reasoned distinctions between material and immaterial state law provisions.
On at least one occasion, the OCC confessed its inability to provide a general standard for detennining which state law provisions are material See Gregory J. Pulles, Exporting Non-Interest-Rate Provisions, 39 Bus. LAW. 1251 LAW. , 1271 LAW. -73 (1984 (summarizing an unpublished OCC interpretive letter that acknowledged the OCC's inability to provide the "general answer" to the materiality question and displaying a "mild surprise" at the OCC's timidity in articulating a standard). credit-card late fees are clearly material and hence preempted, according to this very inclusive standard. As two commentators have pointed out, 108 however, this "all-ornothing" approach gives rise to some grave problems. The approach, in many instances, would result in "artificial substitutions" of a set of provisions designed for one type of loan transaction for another set suitable for a quite different type of transaction.109 For example, 11 0 assume that the State of Hutchins allows banks to charge interest at fifteen percent for open-end credit-card transactions and allows some nonbank state-licensed lenders to charge twenty percent for closed-end consumer loans with stated maturity dates. The fifteen-percent open-end credit-card rate may be accompanied by a provision allowing banks to charge annual fees and another requiring banks to give consumers thirty-day grace periods before interest on their purchases starts to accrue. The twentypercent consumer rate, on the other hand, may be accompanied by a provision prohibiting the charging of annual fees and no provision requiring grace periods. Under NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521, a national or FDIC-insured state bank located in Hutchins, for its open-end credit-card transactions, may borrow the higher closed-end consumer-loan rate. But for the privilege of charging a higher rate, the bank may be barred from charging annual fees. At the same time, consumers, when using credit cards issued by that bank, would be deprived of the usual grace period before interest begins to accrue. The banks borrowing the most favored lender rate, as well as consumers, must consider this result highly undesirable.111
Even more undesirable and absurd results would obtain if nonfinancial provisions of state laws were considered material. For example, the State of Hutchins may allow its small loan companies to charge a higher rate of interest for a particular type of loan than the rate that its banks are allowed to charge. Hutchins, however, may require the small loan companies also to comply with some strict nonfinancial provisions -such as those dealing with licensing, examination, and disclosure requirements. Whether creditors are required to comply with such nonfinancial requirements often has significant implications for creditors' aggregate yields and borrow- ers' aggregate costs in loan transactions. Under the most favored lender doctrine, a national or FDIC-insured state bank located in Hutchins may borrow the higher small-loan-company rate on credit-card transactions. It, however, would be irrational to require these banks also to comply with the licensing, examination, and disclosure requirements that are designed specially for small-loancompany transactions.112
Furthermore, state law provisions that ultimately affect creditors' total yields may range far beyond those contained in the state usury or loan laws. 113 Even a state's capitalization requirements and tax laws often has significant implications for creditors' aggregate yields. 114 It would be absurd to think, however, as the logic of the all-or-nothing approach demands, that NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 preempted state capitalization requirements and tax laws having significant implications for creditors' ultimate yields. 115 
C. Interest-Penalty Distinction Redux
Therefore, what is needed is a scope of preemption greater than that of interest rates yet smaller than that of all state laws affecting creditors' yields and borrowers' costs. Once again, the distinction between interest and penalty can be appealed to. The line between material and immaterial state law provisions should be drawn between state laws governing requirements preconditional to credit extensions, on the one hand, and state laws regulating contingent occasions of default, on the other. The Supreme Court's conflict preemption jurisprudence justifies this distinction.
The Supreme Court, in conflict preemption cases, repeatedly has pointed out that a mere possibility of conflict between federal and state laws is insufficient to warrant a finding of preemption; 112. See Howard J. Finkelstein, Most Favored Lender Status for Insured Banks, 42 Bus. LAW. 915, 918-19 (1987) . A Minnesota appeals court decided in 1986 that certain disclosure requirements were immaterial but did not offer a rationale for this decision . See First Bank E. v. Bobeldyk, 391 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986 REV. 1127 REV. , 1127 REV. -29 (1985 , and the states reacted by enacting detailed consumer-protection laws to safeguard their citizens, see Burgess & Ciolli, supra note 78, at 935. The resulting complexity adds to the potential for absurd substitutions of one set of state law provisions for another.
only an obvious or imminent conflict will do. 11 6 In Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 117 the Court warned against "seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists."118 Furthermore, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 11 9 the Court opined that the proper approach in conflict preemption cases is an analysis that reconciles "the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted."120
When an artificial substitution of one set of state law provisions for another occurs, even in purely intrastate transactions, consumers are deprived of the consumer protection their state legislature devised for them. The same occurs in interstate transactions, when a national or FDIC-insured state bank exports the most favored lender rate to customers residing in other states. Because the bank thereby also would be exporting the material provisions of its homestate law: along with the rate, the corresponding state law provisions of the importing state would be preempted. 121 Such an occurrence denies consumers of the importing state the protection their elected legislators devised for them.
An attempt to reconcile the operations of NBA section 85 and DIDA section 521 and those of state consumer-credit-protection laws must be made. One means of reconciliation is to reinvoke the distinction between state laws regulating interest rates and fees, payment of which is a precondition for loan extensions, on the one hand, and those laws coming into play only on contingent occasions 116. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 545 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973) ); Florida Lime & Avo· cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[F] or an Act of Congress completely to displace a State law, 'the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.'" (citation omitted)).
117. 362 U. S. 440 (1960 According to this approach, rate-related state law provisions, such as those governing the frequency of compounding, and those dealing with required fees, such as annual fees and cash-advance fees, would be considered material to the determination of the interest rate. On the other hand, state Jaw provisions dealing with, for example, creditor remedies and grace periods for debtors would be considered immaterial. Consequently, state law provisions dealing with late fees on credit-card transactions would be considered immaterial and hence escape the preemptive reach of the NBA and the DIDA. 123 Admittedly, drawing the line between material and immaterial provisions to coincide with the line between preconditional and contingent charges does not result in complete parity between national and FDIC-insured state banks, on the one hand, and the most favored state lenders, on the other. If state laws allowed the most favored state lenders to charge certain contingent fees while prohibiting all banks from charging the same fees, then the national and FDIC-insured state banks would suffer from a competitive disadvantage. On the other hand, if state laws allowed only banks to charge certain contingent fees, then national and FDIC-insured banks would have an advantage over the most favored state lenders. The ideal of complete lender parity would not be achieved in either instance.
122. Section II.D appealed to this distinction to show that the case law under NBA § 85 does not demand treating credit-card late fees as interest under DIDA § 521.
123. A clarification must be made. Wbile only those state laws that deal with preconditions for extension of credit should be considered material, not all such provisions should be considered material. State law provisions governing specific application procedures, building licenses, taxation, the minimum wage, and other disparate aspects of bank operation all significantly affect creditors' ultimate yields on credit-card transactions. They are preconditional provisions given that they come into play even when a default does not occur. But maintaining that all such state law provisions deal with interest, no matter how slight the nexus between such provisions and interest rates, could not have been the intent of Congress in enacting the NBA or the DIDA. Therefore, although all state law provisions dealing with contingent occasions of default should be considered immaterial, it must be left as an open question which individual state law provisions dealing with preconditional aspects of credit transactions are material. In sum, what is recommended is treating the fact that a state law provision comes into effect only on contingent occasions of default as a sufficient, though not a necessary, condition for that provision to escape preemption.
This means that the interest-penalty distinction approach does not provide a complete solution to the problem of delineating the proper preemptive scope of NBA § 85 and DIDA § 521. The distinction, however, does provide the courts, the OCC, banks, and consumers with an initial and firm foothold in dealing with the issue. [Vol. 94:1294 This failure to eliminate every conceivable obstacle to achieving lender parity, however, does not mean that drawing the line between preconditional and contingent charges poses an illegitimate obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the objectives of the NBA and the DIDA. First, complete lender parity can be achieved only if national and FDIC-insured state banks are governed by exactly the same set of regulations as the most favored state lenders. Yet, as arguments in the preceding section showed, the all-or-nothing approach is simply unacceptable. The linedrawing problem cannot be avoided.
Second, any conflict that might be implicated by the interestpenalty distinction would be very slight. With respect to all state consumer-credit-protection provisions governing the terms, compliance with which is preconditional to credit extensions, the interestpenalty distinction approach allows complete lender parity between national and FDIC-insured banks, on the one hand, and the most favored state lenders on the other. State consumer-creditprotection laws are left intact and may create lender disparity only on contingent occasions of borrower default. Given that complete lender parity cannot be achieved 124 and that there is no evidence to suggest that Congress meant to preempt all state banking or consumer-credit-protection laws, 125 it follows that Congress was willing to tolerate and even anticipated such minimal amounts of conflict.
The Supreme Court's conflict preemption jurisprudence buttresses this conclusion. The Court in the past has sustained state laws erecting slight barriers to the full efficacy of federal statutes when those state laws were aimed at promoting genuine and substantial interests of the states. For example, in 519 (1978) , the Court sustained the New York strike-insurance program that paid unemployment compensation to striking employees and imposed the costs for financing such bene-ingness to sustain state laws aimed at the promotion of genuine and substantial state interests despite some slight conflicts with the federal statutes involved.129
In sum, the possibility of minimal conflicts implicated by the proposed solution based on the interest-penalty distinction should be tolerated given states' genuine and substantial interests in protecting credit consumers. In fact, it can be inferred from the unacceptability of the all-or-nothing approach that Congress did not intend to achieve complete lender parity "at all costs."
D. Two Possible Objections to the Interest-Penalty Distinction
Two possible objections should be addressed briefly. First, one may object that the interest-penalty distinction approach would enable a state to discriminate against national and "foreign" -meaning, "out-of-state" -banks by artfully labeling certain fees as "contingent" and allowing only the banks chartered by it to charge such fees. 130. See Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 900 P.2d 690, 700 (Cal. 1995 ), cert. granted, No. 95-860, 1996 WL 18433 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996 ; see also Jeremy Rosenblum, Exporting Annual Fees, 41 Bus. LAW. 1039 LAW. , 1042 LAW. (1986 (posing the same objection considering annual fees to be outside the scope of interest as that term is used in NBA § 85). against national or foreign banks would be a paradigm example of state behavior proscribed by the Dormant Commerce Clause.131 A state law's escape from the clutches of preemption does not guarantee its safety from other constitutional constraints.
Second, one may object to the interest-penalty distinction by appealing to the OCC's interpretive letters. In occasional interpretive letters, the OCC has stated that NBA section 85 preempted state laws regulating late fees on credit-card transactions. 132 Many courts have relied on these and other OCC interpretive letters in deciding the preemption issue. 1 3 3 It then may be argued that the OCC's declaring credit-card late fees to be material to the determination of the interest rate indicates that state law provisions prohibiting credit-card late fees conflict with the national policy regarding interest-rate regulation.
The OCC's interpretive letters, however, merit very little weight on the issue of preemption. In I. 134 the Supreme Court held that deference to or reliance on an administrative agency's interpretation is misplaced when "a pure question of statutory construction" is involved. 135 The Cardoza-Fonseca Court drew a distinction between the narrow issue of ascertaining congressional intent and the broader issue of how the statute should be applied and held that the former issue falls "well within the province of the Judiciary."136
The The DIDA, after all, is a step contributing to that trend. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 6894 (1980) ("On the competition theme, [the DIDA] marks an historic tum .... It relies more on the forces of the marketplace and less on the forces of regulation in shaping the structure of our financial system." (statement of Sen. Proxmire)). In 1994, Congress enacted the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) Vol. 94:1294 Yet, some studies indicate that the bank-credit-card industry has not been a paradigm of the free market at work. The bank-creditcard market has all the attributes that usually lead to the creation of a perfectly competitive market. For example, there are many sellers and buyers; there are no significant sunk costs or barriers to entry; and there is no evidence of any collusion on price or quantity.139 Despite these facts, credit-card interest rates have proved to be remarkably "sticky" and banks continue to reap "supranormal" profits from their credit-card operations -three to five times the overall profit rate in banking. 14 0 In 1994, for example, eight of the top nine commercial banks, ranked by the return on their assets, specialized in credit-card loans. 141 One economist has suggested that wishful thinking and self-deception on the part of consumers chiefly explain the high level and "stickiness" of credit-card interest rates. 142 One very clear indication of widespread consumer irrationality is the fact that consumers are much more sensitive to increases in annual fees than to similar increases in the interest rates. 143 This fact has not escaped commercial banks. Taking notice of consumer resistance to annual fees and even some recent resistance to high interest rates, banks have turned to other, subtler, methods of generating revenue. 144 Charging late fees has been the most obvious and widespread of the new methods. 14 5 Banks also have resorted to changing interest-calculation methods to charge interest as of the date a purchase is made, rather than as of the date a purchase is charged to a customer's account for payment, increasing over-the-credit-limit fees, and adding fees to customers' balances for interest calculation. 146 Credit-card-issuing banks thus have sought to circumvent what little benefit consumers have derived from competition. It must be questioned whether competition alone can provide effective checks on such subtle methods of revenue generation.1 47 In the foregoing Parts, this Note argued that Congress, neither in enacting NBA section 85 nor in enacting DIDA section 521, intended competition to be the only source of checks on such methods.
146. See Harrigan, supra note 144, at 82. 147 . Some studies by psychologists suggest that people generally evaluate their prospective actions in terms of a "minimal account," which includes only the direct consequences of the considered actions. Such a simplified method of evaluation has the advantage of reducing cognitive strain. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 456-57 (1981 ) . This paradigm would mean that consumers, in evaluating different credit-card programs, generally would compare them based on annual fees and interest rates but not on fees they would be liable for in contingent occasions of default.
